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NOTES
THE "DISCOVERY"

OF ARTICLE

2317

Plaintiff's automobile was demolished by a falling magnolia tree
which grew on the defendant's lot. The trial court and the First Circuit Court
of Appeal determined that since the defendant had not been proven negligent, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages. The supreme court
reversed, holding that under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317,' proof of
negligence is not required to establish liability when injury is caused by a
defective thing in the custody of the defendant. Loescher v. Parr,324 So.
2d 441 (La. 1976).

The scheme of delictual responsibility in Louisiana is contained in
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315-2322. Article 23152 establishes that
every person is bound to repair damage caused by his fault. Fault is defined
by article 2316' as encompassing not only deliberately harmful actions, but
also negligent ones. Article 2317 states that a person is liable for damage
caused not only by his own actions, but also by the actions of "persons for
4

whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody."

Traditionally, Louisiana courts restricted the application of this article by
construing it, as merely an introduction to the following articles, 2318-

2322,1 which provide specific instances when a person is responsible for
damage caused by persons or things in his custody. 6 Consequently, article

2317 was not interpreted as an independent basis for liability, and insomuch
I. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2317 states inter alia: "We are responsible, not only for the
damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for
whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody."
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315 states inter alia: "Everyact whateverof manthat causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it" (Emphasis added).
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2316: "Every person is responsible for the damage he
occasions not merely by his act, but by negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill."
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317.
5. See, e.g., Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363,368, 174 So. 876,878(1937); Arrington v.
Hearin Tank Lines, Inc., 80 So. 2d 167, 173 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Tunc, Louisiana Tort
Law at the Crossroads, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1111 (1974); Comment, Tort Law in LouisianaThe Supplementary Tort Articles 2317-2332, 44 TUL. L. REV. 119, 147-49 (1969).
6. These specific instances include: liability of parents for minor children, LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2318; liability of curators for insane persons, LA. Civ. CODE art. 2319; liability of
employers for employees., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320; liability of owners for animals, LA.
CIv. CODE art. 2321; liability of owners for the ruin in of buildings, LA. CIv. CODE art.
2322.
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as article 2316 was viewed as the exclusive definition of fault under the

code, 7 Louisiana jurisprudence traditionally held that liability could not be
imposed under articles 2317-2322 without proofsof negligence, since these
articles were read in light of articles 2315 and 2316.8
The first indication that article 2317 might serve a more important role

in Louisiana tort law came in 1968 when the First Circuit Court of Appeal
held in Dupre v. Traveler's Insurance Co.9 that when a thing causes
damage, article 2317 can be used to create a rebuttable presumption of

negligence on the part of the owner of that thing. ' 0 However, the requirement that negligence be established before liability could be imposed under

this article was not abandoned. In fact, a year later, in Cartwright v.
Fireman'sInsurance Co. of Newark, N.J.," the Louisiana Supreme Court
specifically reaffirmed that article 2317 had to be read in light of articles
2315 and 2316.12
Under most legal systems, including Louisiana's, negligence is considered an acceptable standard for assessing delictual responsibility. In
modern crowded and industrialized societies, however, there is a growing
tendency to expand the liability of those causing injury.' 3 This tendency
7. Moses v. Butts, 70 So. 2d 203, 206 (La. App. IstCir. 1954): "When a person, by
his fault, causes damage to another, either by his act, his negligence, his imprudence, or
his want of skill, he is obliged to repair it" (Emphasis added). Cf. Brown v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 234 La. 860, 866, 101 So. 2d 696,698 (1958); Samson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 205 So. 2d 496,502 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1967); Helgason v. Hartford Ins. Co., 187 So. 2d
140 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
8. See, e.g., Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La. 66, 74-75, 165 So. 453, 455-56 (1936);
Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 593-610, 157 So. 121, 122-30 (1934); Martinez v.
Bernhard, 106 La. 368, 30 So. 901 (1901); Tunc, supra note 5, at 1120. In some instances,
however, strict liability was imposed under articles 2320 and 2322. See Blanchard v.
O'Gima, 253 La. 34, 42-44, 215 So. 2d 902, 904-05 (1968) (supreme court recognized that
Louisiana had long used under article 2320 a type of "respondeat superior" doctrine
similar to that found at common law, even though such an interpretation was considered a
derogation from the codal scheme). See also Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian
Traditionin Louisiana,33 LA. L. REV. 357, 384 (1972); Note, 43 TUL. L. REV. 907 (1969);
Note, 32 TUL. L. REV. 146, 149 (1959).
9. 213 So. 2d 98 (La. App. IstCir. 1968).
10. Id. at 100. The court found that the defendant had successfully sustained his
burden of proof and had therefore rebutted the presumption which had been raised. Id. See
also Duplechin v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 256 So. 2d 787, 793 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1972).
II. 254 La. 330, 223 So. 2d 822 (1969).
12. "Except in the food and drink cases . . . the courts of this state have
consistently rejected any deviation from the theory that Revised Civil Code Article
2317 must be read in connection with Revised Civil Code Articles 2315 and 2316."
Id. at 338, 223 So. 2d at 825.
13. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 494-96 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
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manifests itself most clearly in the imposition of strict liability 4 in several
areas of tort law. 5 In other instances where strict liability is not applicable,
aids such as res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se for violation of penal
statutes, or various presumptions of negligence are often available. 6
Another theory which reaches results similar to the imposition of strict

liability has evolved in several civilian jurisdictions, notably France and
Belgium. This theory imposes liability "without proof of negligence on
persons charged with the care of things for the damage caused by those
things.' 7 This liability is based on codal provisions equivalent to

Louisiana's article 2317 and in France has reached the point where it can
properly be termed absolute liability.'

8

Although Louisiana has also expanded the available scope of delictual
responsibility in several areas,' 9 article 2317 had not been used for this
purpose prior to Loescher. Instead, strict liability was imposed in several
areas on the basis of code articles that exist independently of the code
Harris, Liability Without Fault, 6 TUL. L. REV. 337 (1932); Pound, The End of Law as
Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrine, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 233 (1914).
14. This term is most often defined as "liability without fault." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1591 (4th ed. rev. 1968). In Louisiana, fault has recently been given a very
expanded meaning and often fault has been found in situations where the traditional
concept of strict liability would seem to be applicable. See notes 30 & 32, infra.
Consequently, "non-negligent liability" would be a more accurate term when dealing with
Louisiana law.
15. Some examples are strict liability for damage caused by animals, fire and
abnormally dangerous things and activities. PROSSER at 492-516.
16. Crabb, Res lpsa Loquitur and Article 1384 of the French Civil Code, 4 INTER.
AMER, L. REV. 257 (1962): ". . . Another and less drastic device for securing justice for
the innocent plaintiff . . . 'is to retain the theory of fault liability, but accord the plaintiff
certain procedural advantages." See PROSSER at 190-204, 208-21.
17. For an excellent comparative discussion of the developments in this area see
Stone, Liability For Damage Caused by Things, I I INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoMP. LAW 3
(1971). See also F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 46-50 (1950); Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe, 79 U. PA. L.
REV. 271 (1931).
18. Tunc, supra note 5, at I 119. Referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code
(LA. Civ. CODE art. 2317), Professor Tunc stated: "Two things, at least, are reasonably
clear, and they relate to the main points of interest in Louisiana: (a) article 1384, as
construed, is applicable to all things; (b) article 1384, as construed, contains a rule of
absolute liability bearing on the 'guardian' of a thing for the damage resulting from a defect
of that thing." Id. See Crabb, supra note 16, at 261-64; Malone, Damage Suits and the
Contagious Principle of Workmen's Compensation, 12 LA. L. REV. 231 (1951); Starck, The
Foundation of Delictual Liability in Contemporary French Law-An Evaluation and
Proposal, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1043 (1974); Stone, supra note 17, at 7.
19. Prominent examples are: (I) liability for damage caused by ultrahazardous
activities, e.g., Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627 (1968);
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section on delictual responsibility. 20 Two such articles, Civil Code articles
66721 and 669,22 were used as the basis for imposition of strict liability for
damage caused by ultrahazardous activities. 23 These articles deal primarily
with property rights, however, and the inconsistency of imposing tort
liability on the basis of property statutes created problems. 24 In an attempt to
solve these problems the supreme court in Langlois v. Allied Chemical
Corp.25 held that article 2315 is in fact the basis for all delictual responsibility in Louisiana, including strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. This
is so, according to the court, because the term "fault" in that article refers to
more than merely moral wrongs. 26 The Court further noted that the
examples of fault provided by article 2316 are merely illustrative of a much
broader concept.27
Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 293 (1957); and (2) liability for damage done by
defective products, e.g., Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North
America, Inc., 262 La. 80,262 So. 2d 377 (1972); Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La.
599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
20. See, e.g., Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502,211 So. 2d 627 (1968);Gulf
Ins. Co. v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Co., 170 So. 2d 125, 127 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965):
"While negligence is an example of 'fault' within the meaning of article 2315, it is well
settled that the obligation upon proprietors imposed by Article 667 is absolute and that
proof of negligence is not required in order to recover for a breach thereof."
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667: "Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever
'he pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the
liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
22. LA. Civ. CODE art. 669: "If the works or materials for any manufactory or other
operation, cause an inconvenience to those in the same or in the neighboring houses, by
diffusing smoke or nauseous smell, and there be no servitude established by which they
are regulated, their sufferance must be determined by the rules of the police, or the
customs of the place."
23. E.g., Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627 (1968);
Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 293 (1957); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 18 LA. L. REV. 63
(1957).
24. The problems arose from difficulty in determining: (I) whether the article applied
only to landowners or to others using the land, and (2) what prescriptive period would
apply. See W. MALONE & L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORT LAW 456-70 (1970).

25. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Property, 32 LA. L. REV. 165,185 (1971); Note, 43 TUL. L.
REV. 907 (1971).
26. Id. at 1074, 249 So. 2d at 136, 137.
27. Id. The court further explained: "The activities of man for which he may be liable
without acting negligently are to be determined after a study of the law and customs, a
balancing of claims and interests, a weighing of the risk and gravity of harm, and a
consideration of individual and societal rights and obligations." Id. In accord with this
rationale, the court noted that article 669 establishes a standard of care which can be used
under article 2315 by analogy to determine fault in the circumstances at hand. The
expansive potential of this method is illustrated by the court's statement: "Just as we have
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This concept of fault did not alter the scope of liability for ultrahazardous activities but merely changed its basis. The concept did, however,
provide a method for removing the restrictive requirement of proving
negligence that had previously limited the application of article 2317.28

After Langlois doctrinal attention was focused on the possibility of imposing liability without negligence on the basis of article 2317, as France and
29
Belgium had already done through the use of similar articles.
This application of article 2317 was made possible by Langlois and
foreshadowed by the supreme court in two decisions that preceded
Loescher. In Holland v. Buckley3 the court held that under article 2321 the
owner of an animal was liable for damage it caused even though the owner
had no knowledge of its dangerous propensities and was not negligent in his
care of the animal. 3 Several months later, in Turner v. Bucher,3 2 the court
held that the parent of a minor child was liable for damage caused by the
wrongful act of the child, even though the child was too young to be

considered negligent and the parent had not been negligent in his supervifound in the Code many standards of conduct, many statutes and local ordinances also
detail standards of conduct which courts may apply per se, impliedly or by analogy.
Criminal laws, traffic regulations, zoning laws, health laws, and others may and often do
set the standard for lawful conduct in personal relationships, although they are designed
for societal protection and incorporate penalties and specific consequences for their mere
breach." Id. at 137.
28. Barham, supra note 8, at 384: "Before Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., fault
under article 2315 was defined as negligence. Therefore, we could not remove the
jurisprudential stricture upon article 2315, until we held in Langlois that fault, as
expressed in article 2315, encompassed acts which cause damage other than negligent
acts."
29. Tunc, supra note 5; Barham, supra note 8; Tort Law in Louisiana, supra note 5;
Note, 43 TUL. L. REV. 907 (1969). See Note, 48 TUL. L. REV. 754 (1974), for a discussion of
the influence of Justices Barham and Tate in this area.
30. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
31. Prior to Holland, cases in this area had'allowed recovery on three theories: (I)
proof of the dangerous propensities of the animal and a presumption of knowledge on the
part of the owner, Tamburello v. Jaeger, 249 La. 25, 184 So. 2d 544 (1966); Serio v.
American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290,74 So. 988 (1917); Beach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 234 So.
2d 215 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); (2) a rebuttable presumption of fault raised when the animal
caused harm, Bentz v. Page, 115 La. 560, 39 So. 599 (1905); Granger v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 266 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); (3) proof of the dangerous
propensities of the animal and actual knowledge of them on the part of the owner, Cox v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 284 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Losch v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 264
So. 2d 240 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 262 La. 1106,266 So. 2d 450 (1972); Rolen v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 240 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 256 La. 1149,241 So. 2d
252 (1970). In each instance the basis for imposing liability was proof of negligence, 305
So. 2d at 116, 117.
32. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
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sion of the child. 3 3 Although in neither case did the court find the defendant

negligent, it did find in accord with its holding in Langlois, that both
defendants were at fault. 34
Following the trend initiated by Holland and Turner, the supreme

court in Loescher v. Par,35 held that a person having custody of a defective
thing which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others is liable for
damages caused by that thing even though he was not negligent. 36 The fault
required under article 2315 is found in his allowing the thing over which he
has custody to create such an unreasonable risk of harm. 37 The court also
held that no liability attaches if the damage was caused by the fault of the
38
victim, the fault of a third person, or by a fortuitous event.

The decision in Loescheris an indication of the effect which the fault
concept initiated by Langlois has had and will have on Louisiana tort law.
Moreover, it is a recognition of the potential of article 2317, a heretofore

untapped source of tort liability.39 The decision appears to align Louisiana
tort law with Belgian law which has similarly interpreted its corresponding
article. However, Loescher is only a first step, and many questions remain

concerning article 2317 and its effect on Louisiana law.
One serious question left unanswered by Loescher is the definition of
the term "defect." Other than holding that a ninety percent rotten tree is
defective,' ° the court did little to explain the term except to refer to the

creation of an "unreasonable risk of harm" to others. 4' "Defect" is most
often associated with products liability law, 42 but the definitions usually
33. Prior to Turner a parent was not liable for damage done by a minor child of such
tender years that he lacked the capacity for discernment, Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La.
586, 157 So. 121 (1934), unless liability could be based on the parent's negligence in failing
to supervise the child.
34. See, e.g., Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 119(La. 1974): "Article 2321 places the
master of the animal under a legal obligation to keep his animal under such guard that it
does no damage to others. A fault in this obligation to control the animal and guard others
from harm by it entitles the victim to recover damages sustained thereby" (Emphasis
added).
35. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976).
36. Id. at 446.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 447. See text at note 47, infra.
39. Belgian law also requires that the thing be defective before the owner can be held
liable for damage caused by it. Tunc, supra note 5, at 1120; Stone, supra note 17, at 7.
40. 324 So. 2d at 449.
41. Id.at 446.
42. "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused. . ."RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966). See also Weber v. Fidelity
& Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); PROSSER at 659.
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3
applied in that context would not seem applicable under article 2317.1

Further, the court's use of the phrase "creating an unreasonable risk of
harm" threatens a return to negligence concepts." A further explanation of
this term is needed to clarify the extent to which the requirement of proving
defectiveness will limit the application of article 2317.
The Court did explain rather extensively its interpretation of the term
"custody." It noted that this term should apply to "...
those things to

which one bears such a relationship to as to have the right of direction and
45
control over them, and to draw some kind of benefit from them."

However, the definition of this term has created difficulties for the Belgian
courts in administering a conceptual framework very similar to the type
46

elucidated in Loescher.

A unique problem arises in the court's statement that a defendant may
avoid liability by showing that the damage was caused by the fault of the
victim or of a third person. It is not clear what the term "fault" will mean in

that context, in light of the expansive definition given to it in Loescher.
Also, the court did not state whether the fault of the victim must be the sole
cause of the damage, or merely a contributing factor.
43. The most often used definition of defect is a failure to ". . . meet the reasonable
expectations of the ordinary consumer as to the product's safety." PROSSER at 659;
Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REV. 363 (1965). This definition is obviously inapplicable in situations covered by the
Loescher holding. Defining a defect as a condition that is unreasonably dangerous, as the
court appeared to do in Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 447, would not seem to be any more
appropriate, since this would revert to negligence concepts. See note 44, infra.
44. Negligence is often defined as the failure to act as a reasonable man would act
under the circumstances. It is also defined as conduct which falls below the standard
established by law for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm.
PROSSER at 145-47. In defining a defect it is difficult to see how the court will be able to
avoid references to the negligence standard it repudiated unless a more specific definition
of defect is given or unless the requirement of a defect is simply ignored.
45. 324 So. 2d at 449 n.6. From that definition custody would include not only
ownership, but also bailment, lease, loan for use and possession by repairmen among
others. It would not include agency, employment or other situations in which there is a
principal who remains responsible. Verlander, We Are Responsible. . . . in 2 Tulane Civil
Law Forum No. 2, p. 64 (1974).
46. Tunc, supra note 5, at 1120, interpreting I R. Dalcq, Trait de la responsibilit
civile Nos. 2058-126 (2d ed. 1967, Les Nouvelles, Droit Civile, Vol. II).
47. In Langlois the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that contributory negligence
would not be a bar to recovery under the fault concept since negligence was not an issue,
but that assumption of the risk would bar recovery. 249 So. 2d at 148. Whether this rule
would apply to contributory fault is not discussed in Loescheror Langlois. This creates a
dual problem of determining the meaning of fault in that context, and of deciding whether
that fault must be the (1) sole cause, (2) a superseding cause, (3) a major cause, or merely
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Though the questions discussed above are significant, perhaps the
most important remaining one is the viability of the Loescher holding itself.

In a four to three decision the court has chosen a new and potentially
confusing method for extending liability under article 2317.48 In light of the

fact that the use of a presumption of negligence under this article could
accomplish similar results while retaining familiar negligence concepts and
definitions,49 the future of the Loescher approachis by no means certain."0
David Dugas

SUPERVISORY WRITS:

A

SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN APPELLATE
REVIEW OF FACTS

AND THE RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY TRIAL?

Plaintiffs brought an action to recover for the death of their minor
daughter who was struck by a car driven by defendant's employee. After a

jury verdict in favor of the defendant, plaintiffs appealed, claiming that the
trial judge's refusal to give a requested instruction' prevented the jury from
applying the correct legal principle to the facts. The appellate court held that
this refusal was reversible error and remanded the case for a new trial. 2 The
Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that the jury instruction should have been

given but held that when a court of appeal is in possession of a full record, it
(4) a link in the causal chain of damage done to the plaintiff in order that the defendant be
exonerated from liability.
48. The approach is potentially confusing because of the references to negligence
concepts that are made while attempting to move beyond those same concepts. See note
44, supra.
49. Using article 2317 to raise a presumption of negligence as done in Dupre v.
Traveler's Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 98 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1968), could accomplish essentially the
same end as Loescher by merely raising the burden of rebuttal. See text at notes 9 & 10,
supra. Cf. Simon v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
50. An indication as to how the Louisiana Supreme Court may view Loescherin the
future may be found in recent "slip and fall" cases in which the court did notapply article
2317 to determine a storekeeper's liability, but rather used a presumption of negligence.
See Gonzales v. Winn Dixie, 326 So. 2d 486 (La. 1976). If Loescher is extended to other
situations in the future, it will almost certainly be used in automobile "latent defect"
cases, since the court expressly overruled.Cartwright v. Fireman 'sIns. Co., 254 La. 330,
223 So. 2d 822 (1969).
I. Gonzales v. XeroxCorp., 320So. 2d 163, 164(La. 1975). The requested instruction
concerned a motorist's duty to keep a close watch; the general instruction given by the judge
dealt with a motorist's duty when approaching small children.
2. 307 So. 2d 153 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1974).

